Philip Fisher on Quality Businesses

5 INDEXED REFERENCES1955–19585 SHOWN FREE

Wonderful franchises earning high returns on capital.

SELECTED REFERENCES

1958 · Harper & Brothers

Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits (key principles, paraphrased)

Fisher argued that the greatest investment returns come not from buying cheap assets but from owning a small number of genuinely exceptional growth companies for very long periods. His career rested on the observation that a business compounding sales at an above-average rate for decades can make its initial purchase price look almost irrelevant in hindsight, provided the investor picked the right business and held through its inevitable rough patches.

1958 · Harper & Brothers

Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits (key principles, paraphrased)

Fisher laid out fifteen points to check before buying a growth stock, centered on whether a company's products had the potential to grow sales for years, whether it was investing in research to keep that potential alive, whether its sales organization was outstanding, whether profit margins were healthy and defensible, and whether management maintained the disciplines needed to keep improving. He emphasized that few companies would pass every test — the goal was excellence on the ones that mattered most for that business.

1958 · Harper & Brothers

Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits (key principles, paraphrased)

Fisher distinguished companies with products so good that customers would pay a premium or accept inconvenience to keep using them — his shorthand for genuine franchise economics. He advised looking for firms whose products had enough of an edge, in technology or service, that they did not need to be the cheapest to win, and he pointed to margins held while competition intensified as evidence of that edge.

1955 · Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, ch. 3 (investing case)

The Motorola and Texas Instruments cases (documented recollections)

Fisher's Motorola position, begun in 1955 after researching the company's engineering culture through his scuttlebutt network, was held for the rest of his life and became the canonical proof of his method. The initial decision rested less on the numbers of the moment than on what customers, engineers, and competitors said about the firm's product quality and research pipeline.

1955 · Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, ch. 3 (investing case)

The Motorola and Texas Instruments cases (documented recollections)

Fisher described what he looked for in the people running technical companies: executives who understood engineering well enough to choose the right projects, a research organization with genuine freedom to look years ahead, and a sales force able to explain complex products to customers. He judged that in technical businesses, the gap between the best-run and average firms compounds just as powerfully as the financial results.

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