Warren Buffett on Patience

During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase. Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.” Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium. The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable. * * * * * * * * * * * * This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely.

Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares. An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be. Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire. The Scorecard in 2023 Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation: (in $ millions) 2023 2022 Insurance-underwriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage. • You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest. • Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy. • A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that. • Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time. • Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying. • There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice. • You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich. • You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change. • Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never. • Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it.

To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity. Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site: In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer – or ‘machine intelligence’ – will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with $10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie. That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were $1,000 each. To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his action. He promptly laid off $500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.) Now, to my bet and its history.

It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one. What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things. The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart. The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

In October 2008, with the world's financial system apparently collapsing, I wrote an op-ed for the New York Times titled Buy American. I Am. The headline was not a slogan; it was a description of what I was actually doing with my personal account. I was buying American stocks. The rule that guided me was simple, and I had learned it from Graham decades earlier: be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful. In the autumn of 2008, fear was at a level I had rarely seen. The S&P 500 had fallen by more than forty percent from its peak, and most observers believed the decline was only beginning. My view was the opposite: the panic had made wonderful businesses available at prices that, in normal times, would have been unthinkable. The pessimism was so thick that even strong, well-capitalised companies were being dumped at distress prices. What I wrote in the op-ed, and what I still believe, is that the long-term outlook for American business was not as bad as the prices implied. The simple rule is that stocks, over time, will outperform cash, because businesses earn a return on capital and cash earns nothing after inflation. During a panic, the market prices stocks as if cash is the only safe asset, and that pricing is almost always wrong. I did not claim to know where the bottom would be. I have never known where the bottom will be, and I never will. What I claimed was that buying a slice of America's future at a marked-down price was the rational bet, made repeatedly over many months, and that the long-run outcome would reward the investor who was willing to look foolish in the short run while he was buying what others were panic-selling. The market-psychology lesson is the most important one. Most investors, when they see the market fall, conclude that the world is ending and they sell at the worst possible moment. The few who hold on are, paradoxically, often the ones who never look at their statements during the panic. The investor who buys when the headlines are terrifying, and who refuses to sell when his neighbours are panicking, has an enormous long-run advantage over the investor who waits for clarity. Clarity, I wrote in 2008, is what kills long-run returns, because by the time the outlook is clear, the prices have already moved. The patience lesson is the simplest one in investing and the hardest to apply: do nothing when the market is calm, do nothing when the market is euphoric, but buy aggressively when the market is in a panic. That is what I was doing in October 2008.

Under these circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of discipline. In his book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size of a baseball. Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would allow him to bat .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of the strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for the fat pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors.

Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."

The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money. We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after- tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.